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I. JURISDICTION OF UTAH SUPREME COURT 
"The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction . . . to be exercised as 
provided by statute."1 This Court has jurisdiction over the "orders, judgments and decrees 
of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals does not have original jurisdiction."2 
The Court of Appeals does not have original jurisidiction over this appeal.3 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Utah Supreme Court exercises cfe novo review of a trial court's grant of 
summary judgment. 
In reviewing a district court's entry of summary judgment, we view the facts 
and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Winegar 
v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104,107 (Utah 1991). We review a trial court's 
grant of summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to its 
conclusions of law. Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Div. Of State Lands & 
Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990).4 
This is the standard of review that is applicable to all of the issues raised by Appellants. 
(Hereinafter, Appellants will be referred to as "Citizens" and Appellees will be referred to 
as "City.") 
1
 Utah Const. Art. VIII § 3. 
2§78-2-3(j)UC.A 
3§78-2a-3(/C.A 
4
 Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 922 P.2d 745, 748 (Utah 1996). 
1 
III. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following are the basic legal questions presented for review in this appeal: 
When undisputed facts5 show that the City violated mandatory requirements in city 
ordinances and state statutes when granting approval to a planned unit development that 
negatively impacts on the Citizens' property interests as adjoining property owners, have 
the liberty and property rights of the Citizens been violated by the City? 
Having established interference with liberty and property interests by the City, are 
the Citizens entitled to their request for declaratory and injunctive relief against the City 
under relevant statues providing for review of City decisions? 
Having established interference with liberty and property interests by the City, are 
the Citizens entitled to recover damages against the City under self-executing provisions 
5
 The Trial court rejected sua sponte some of the undisputed "facts" relied upon by the 
Citizens and not contested by the City. Two included in this appeal deal with the 
possibility of a forged signature on recorded Plat # 4 (Record 1132-1131) and the fact that 
a permit was issued for removal of in excess of 5,000 cubic feet of dirt without engineering 
plans as required by the City Code (Record at 1127). The trial court's rejection of these 
two "facts" and efforts to clarify at least one under Rule 56(f) U.R.Civ. P. and both under 
Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P. are discussed more completely in footnote 19, infra and footnote36, 
infra. While allowance for discovery under Rule 56(f) U.R.Civ.P. is to be liberally applied, 
the standard of review is an abuse of discretion. See American Towers Owners 
Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1194-1195 (Utah 1996). The 
standard of review for a motion under Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P. is a clear abuse of discretion. 
See Board of Commissioners of the Utah State Bar v. Peterson, 937 P.2d 1263, 1267 
(Utah 1997). Even if these two "facts" are not allowed hereafter by this Court, the 
undisputed facts relied upon by the trial court and all parties convincingly show a failure 
by the City to comply with its own ordinances, state and federal law. 
2 
of the Utah Constitution or the Fourteenth and First Amendments of the United States 
Constitution? 
IV. STATE STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS THAT ARE 
DISPOSITIVE IN THIS CASE 
As the Springville Code is referred to in footnotes with references to the Record, 
dispositive state and federal law remaining includes the following: 
State Statutes 
The courts shall: (a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are 
valid; and (b) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal.6 
The board of adjustments shall hear and decide: (a) appeals from zoning 
decisions applying the zoning ordinance. . . and ( c) variances from the 
terms of the zoning ordinances.7 
The planning commission shall:... (3) administer provisions of the zoning 
ordinance, where specifically provided for in the zoning ordinance adopted 
by the legislative body; . . .(5) recommended approval or denial of 
subdivision applications as provided in this chapter; . . . (6) advise the 
legislative body on matters as the legislative body directs; (7) hear and 
decide any matters that the legislative body designates, including the denial 
of, or recommendations to approve or deny, or conditional use permits; (8) 
exercise any other powers (a) that are necessary to enable it to perform that 
function; or (b) delegated to it by the legislative body.8 
(1 )(a) A county recorder may not record a plat of a subdivision without the 
approval of the governing body; 
6
 §10-9-1001(3) U. C.A. 
7
 § 10-9-703(1) L/.C. A 
8
 §§ 10-9-204(3), (5), (6), (7), (8) U.C.A. 
3 
(b) A plat of a subdivision recorded without the approval of the governing 
body required by this part is void.9 
Utah Constitution 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to. . . petition for redress of 
grievance 10 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law.11 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.12 
United States Constitution 
Congress shall make no law . . . . abridging the right of the people . . . to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.13 
. . . [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law.14 
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case illustrates how citizens' efforts to seek redress from government can be 
an exercise in futility when government fails to follow the "plain language" of relevant 
municipal ordinances, state statutes, and state or federal constitutional provisions. 
9
 §10-9-811 U.C.A. 
10
 Utah Const, Art. I § 1 
11
 Utah Const. Art. I § 7 
12
 Utah Const, Art. I §24 
13
 United States Const., First Amendment 
14
 United States Const., Fourteenth Amendment, § 1 
4 
A. Nature of the Case, Proceedings and Disposition 
In this case, the Appellants (hereinafter referred to as "Citizens") are residents of 
the City of Springville, Utah, and own property or homes adjoining the area of land that 
was approved for development as a planned unit development (hereinafter referred to as 
"PUD".) The Appellee (hereinafter referred to as "City") is the City of Springville and the 
Mayor of Springville in his official capacity.15 The City granted preliminary and final 
approval to the PUD. Citizens filed timely appeals to the trial court after the City granted 
preliminary approval, final approval, and refused to allow appeals to the Board of 
Adjustment. Claiming the City had acted illegally, arbitrarily, and capriciously, Citizens 
sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages, attorney fees and costs. 
Among other motions, cross motions for summary judgment were filed by both parties. The 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the City. After Citizens' motion to alter 
or amend the judgment were heard and denied, the Citizens filed a timely appeal to this 
Court. On appeal, Citizens suggest that the undisputed facts in this case provide a 
sufficient basis for this Court to properly rule on Citizens' trial court motions for injunctive 
and declaratory relief and liability as to damages, attorney fees and costs. 
15
 Since the filing of this litigation, Hal Wing has been elected as mayor of Springville 
and should be substituted in place of Mayor Delora Bertelson in accordance with Rule 
38(c) Utah R. App. P. 
5 
B. Factual Foundation for Issues on Appeal 
The disputed PUD is located in the city of Springville, Utah County, Utah. (Record 
at 0054.) When the property containing the disputed PUD was annexed into Springville 
in 1985, the annexation agreement required that each building lot contained in any future 
development contain at least 20,000 square feet, and thus qualify in the RA1-20,000.) 
(Record at 0480.) Citizens are individual residents of the city and property owners who 
live in the area immediately adjoining, or adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the PUD and are 
impacted by reason of the disputed development more than general residents of 
Springville because of, among other things, anticipated matters of traffic flow, projected 
and actual devaluation of their property, water run-off, potential and actual mud-slides, and 
past and future disruption of irrigation water flow. (Record at 0606.) Preliminary approval 
of the PUD was given by the City Council of Springville City (hereinafter referred to as 
"Council") on July 16, 1996. (Record at 0760.) Pursuant to state statute,16 an action 
challenging the granting of preliminary approval was filed within thirty days in the trial court 
challenging the action as being arbitrary, capricious, and illegal. (Record at 0015.) 
16
 Since the granting of a preliminary approval is tantamount to a contract between the 
City and the developer allowing for future development subject to the conditions imposed 
by the preliminary approval, see § 11-4-202(8) (Record at 0306), state law allowing the 
filing of a petition for review of the decision within thirty days in district court after 
exhaustion of administrative remedies, § 10-9-1001(1) U.C.A., is not clear as to whether 
the granting of preliminary approval contrary to mandatory law must be challenged prior 
to the granting of final approval of the development, or whether both may be challenged 
after final approval is given. Regardless, consolidation of both filings resolved the 
question. 
6 
Despite numerous private efforts of Citizens to point out to the Council that ordinances and 
statutes were being violated, (Record at 0259-0246), final approval was given to the first 
phase of the PUD by the Council on November 19,1996. (Record at 0225.) Pursuant to 
state statute, an action challenging the granting of final approval was filed and 
consolidated with the original action challenging preliminary approval. (Record at 0059.) 
At the argument on summary judgment, it was stipulated that the balance of the PUD 
would be bound by the court's rulings. (Record at 1249.) The trial court did not 
understand that the larger development remained an option when its opinion was issued. 
(Record at 1129.) 
1. Preliminary Approval of Plat # 1 
On May 3,1996, the developer filed plans for preliminary approval of the disputed 
PUD. On May 28, 1996, this matter was heard by the Planning and Zoning Commission 
of Springville City (hereinafter referred to as "Commission") (This plan will be referred to 
as Plat #1.) Plat # 1 shows the entire PUD to be developed in its entirety but does not 
show any land facilities that were held in common. (Record at 0428.) In the past, the 
PUD's approved in Springville had common areas that were specifically defined on the 
recorded plats. (Record at 1071-1074.) The Commission made no finding that there were 
any land facilities held in common. (Record at 0597.)17 
17
 The reason why the failure to show or find that any of the land in the development 
was "held in common" is violative of city ordinance is that a planned unit development is 
defined as being "[a] tract of land which is planned and developed as a single entity and 
wherein part of the land facilities is held in common." § 11-10-202(14) (Record at 0414). 
7 
Several of the lots in Plat # 1 were in H-1 (hillside) zone.18 
An environmental impact statement and geologic study were not submitted within 
fifteen days prior to the granting of preliminary approval by the Commission. (Record at 
0598.) 
None of the following documents were submitted to the Planning Commission prior 
to its consideration of and granting preliminary approval to Plat # 1: articles of 
incorporation for the homeowners association; corporation by-laws; covenants, conditions, 
restrictions and management policies (C.C.& R.'s); management agreement; open-space 
easement; sale brochure; documents tendering water rights to the City; and approval of 
the plat by the irrigation company or water users. (Record at 0598-0597.) 
The Commission made no findings regarding any need for variances from City 
ordinances. (Record at 0597.) 
On May 28, 1996 the Commission forwarded Plat # 1 of the disputed PUD to the 
Council with a recommendation that it be approved without any stipulations or conditions. 
(Record at 0597.) 
On July 16, 1996, the Council held a public hearing regarding the disputed PUD. 
Citizens had requested judicial notice be taken of the plats of all prior PUD developments 
in Springville where each had specific land "held in common" to show previous application 
of this requirement. (Record at 1076.) 
18
 With the failure to have land "held in common" — and thus being unable to be a PUD 
under the Springville Code, (footnote 17, id.,) — development could not occur in the H-1 
zone. (Record at 0595) 
8 
(Record at 0760.) The Council made no finding that there were any land facilities held in 
common. (Record at 0596.) Plat # 1 does not show any land facilities that were held in 
common. (Record at 0428.) In the past, the PUD's approved in Springville had common 
areas that were specifically defined on the recorded plats. (Record at 1071-1074.) 
Several of the lots in Plat # 1 were in H-1 (hillside) zone. (Record at 0595.) 
None of the following documents were submitted to the Council prior to its 
consideration of and granting preliminary approval to Plat # 1: articles of incorporation for 
the homeowner's association; corporation by-laws; covenants, conditions, restrictions and 
management policies (C.C.& R.'s); management agreement; open-space easement; sale 
brochure; documents tendering water rights to the City; and approval of the plat by the 
irrigation company or water users. (Record at 0596.) 
The Council made no findings regarding any need for variances from City 
ordinances. (Record at 0760 - 0751.) 
On July 16,1996, using Plat # 1, the City Council gave preliminary approval to the 
disputed PUD with thirty-five building lots, subject to twenty-nine conditions. (Record at 
0753.) 
2. Issuance of Grading Permit 
On July 19, 1996, Springville City Attorney-Engineer Harold Mitchell issued a 
grading permit to the developer, charging a fee in the amount of $ 269.00. (Record at 
0393.) Based on City ordinances, the fee paid for the permit allowed for the removal of 
9 
dirt in excess of 5,000 yards. (Record at 0391 .)19 No engineered plans for grading were 
submitted with the request for a grading permit. (Record at 0595. )20 
On July 25, 1996, Harold Mitchell issued a letter to the developer indicating how the 
preliminary road could be approved as a final road. (Record at 0330.) On July 29, 1996, 
the grading of the road for the disputed PUD began. (Record at 0594.) The grading of the 
road through the disputed PUD was completed about August 30, 1996, long before final 
approval was given on November 19, 1996 (Record at 0594) or the plat recorded on 
December 9, 1996. (Record at 0977.) Even had the engineering plans been provided 
when the permit was sought, granting the permit and allowing excavation and creation of 
the road in the hillside violated mandatory law because "[n]o officer or employee of the City 
shall grant any permit or license for the construction or use of any building or land within 
19
 Even though the City did not object to this undisputed fact, the trial court sua sponte 
rejected this computation (Record at 1127). For the same basic reasons reviewed in 
footnote 36, infra, regarding Citizen's Rule 56(f) motion, the trial court improperly refused 
to allow a deposition to be taken of Harold Mitchell, counsel and engineer for the City. In 
addition, the trial court must, of course, review "the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." K& T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 
888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994). Using City ordinances, the computation of dirt removed 
in excess of 5,000 square feet was a logical inference from City ordinances already in the 
record and not objected to by the City. (Record at 1165-1163.) To not allow the 
unobjected inference to be drawn under either criteria is a clear abuse of discretion. 
20
 This was a violation of City ordinances because "[gjrading in excess of 5,000 cubic 
yards shall be performed in accordance with the approved grading plan prepared by a civil 
engineer and shall be designated as 'engineered grading.'" § 10-6-105(3) (Record at 
3088). "No permit shall be issued for any work regulated or controlled in any way by the 
provisions of this Title unless the application is accompanied by all plats, plans, drawings, 
specifications, and other information required by the various codes adopted hereby." § 10-
4-3 (Record at 0386). 
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a subdivision, unless and until said subdivision has been approved in accordance with the 
requirements of this Chapter."24 
3. Final Approval of Plat # 2 
On August 28,1996, a plat for final approval on only seventeen of the thirty-five 
lots was submitted to the Commission by the developer with the balance to be developed 
and recorded at a later date.25 (This will be referred to as Plat # 2.) (Record at 0326.) On 
September 10,1996, the Commission reviewed Plat # 2. (Record at 0742.) 
The following documents were not submitted to the Commission prior to its granting 
final approval to the disputed PUD on September 10, 1996: final plat; final engineering 
drawings; articles of incorporation for the homeowner's association; corporation by-laws; 
management policies; management agreement; open-space easement; sale brochure; 
documents tendering water rights to the City; approval of the plat by the irrigation company 
or water users; re-vegetation plan; and estimates of costs of construction of 
improvements.26 
24
 § 11 -5-26(1) (Record at 0385.) Under the Springville Code, a PUD was a large 
scale development, § 11-4-201(1) (Record at 0096.) "All large scale developments 
involving the division of land shall be deemed to be subdivisions." § 11-10-202(39) 
(Record at 0094.) 
25
 The trial court's ruling that the development was limited to seventeen lots (Record at 
1229) overlooks, at a minimum, that counsel for the City stipulated that this ruling would 
apply to the entire development, in all of its phases. (Record at 1249; Transcript of 
Argument, June 17,1997, page 10.) 
26
 Under the Springville Code, many of these are required by § 11-4-306. (Record at 
0419.) The final plat is also required by § 11-5-9. (Record at 0308) The approval of the plat 
by the irrigation company or water users is required by § 11-5-7(4) (Record at 0417-0416) 
l l 
Plat # 1 was submitted to the Commission for preliminary approval. Plat # 2 was 
submitted to the Commission for final approval. These plats are different in at least the 
following ways: (1) In Plat # 1, there were thirty-five lots; Plat # 2 had seventeen lots, 
(Record at 0326), (2) In Plat # 1, more than four lots were listed in the H-1 (hillside) zone; 
Plat 2 had only two lots in the H-1 (hillside) zone, (Record at 0590); (3) In Plat # 1, a 
triangular portion of land on the east of Lot # 1 was required to be dedicated to the City; 
Plat # 2 was re-configured so as to no longer include the area east of Lot # 1 and 
eliminated the need to dedicate the triangular portion to the City, (Record at 0590); (4) In 
Plat # 1 was shown all of the land that was to be dedicated to the City for parklands, a 
twenty-foot utility easement-jogging trail along the Highline Irrigation Ditch, and the entire 
park/spring protection area; plat # 2 did not include any of the park/spring protection area 
nor a significant portion of the utility easement-jogging trail, (Record at 590); (5) In Plat 
# 1, each lot had at least 20,000 square feet; in Plat # 2 each of lots 5, 6, 7 and 8 had a 
square footage of approximately 17,000 square feet, (Record at 590). On September 10, 
1996 the Commission made no findings that the final plans conform substantially with 
those given preliminary approval (Record at 590-589).27 
and was condition # 9 imposed on July 16, 1996 when the Council granted preliminary 
approval to the PUD, (Record at 0397), and reaffirmed on October 15, 1996. (Record at 
0248.) The re-vegetation plan was condition # 24 similarly imposed and confirmed. The 
estimates of cost of construction of improvements is required by § 11-4-202(10)(d). 
(Record at 0967). These failures were raised in the trial court. (Record at 0397.) 
27
 This is required by § 11-4-202(10) (Record at 0967.) 
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On September 10,1996 the Commission made no findings that a variance28 could 
be granted regarding the following uses of land in Plat #2: (1) Allowing streets to be made 
contrary to the standard widths and sidewalk requirements, (Record at 0589-0588); (2) 
Allowing two flag lots numbered # 1 and # 2 on the Plat # 2, (Record at 0589-0588); (3) 
Allowing for a building height of a maximum of thirty-nine feet, rather than the twenty feet 
from grade or two stories allowed in the RA-1-20,000 zone, (Record at 0589-0588); (4) 
allowing two flag lots numbered # 34 and # 35 on the Plat # 1 area (which is not shown on 
Plats # 2, 3 or 4), (Record at 0588-0587); (5) allowing lots 5, 6, 7 and 8 to have less than 
20,000 square feet, (Record at 0588-0587); and (6) allowing building lots in the H-1 
(hillside) zone without conformance to PUD requirements, (Record at 0587).29 
On September 10,1996 the Commission failed to make any findings regarding the 
following: (1) the final plans conform substantially with those given preliminary approval, 
(Record at 0590-0589); (2) the final plat complies with the requirements and standards 
relating to the applicable type of large-scale development, (Record at 0590-0589); (3) the 
8
 Springville has various means by which a variance could be determined. Even had 
the PUD requirements been satisfied, as a PUD is a large-scale development (§ 11-4-301 
Record at 964), it also "must confor[m] with City standards and Comprehensive Plan" (§ 
11-4-202(4)(a); Record at 0426.) No amendments may be made which is "contrary to the 
standards and requirements of this Code." (§ 11-4-202(14); Record at 0966). All plans and 
plats are to be prepared "in accordance with City standards." (§ 11-4-203(1); Record at 
0966). See also § 11-5-16 (Record at 0301); §11-5-25 (Record at 0302). 
29
 While the Springville Code allowed for the making of such findings, this requirement, 
however, may be illegal because of its conflict with state law which provides "[t]he board 
of adjustments shall hear and decide . . . (c) variances from the terms of the zoning 
ordinance." § 10-9-703(1 )(c) U.C.A. (emphasis added). 
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final documents and statements comply with the standards relating to the applicable type 
of large-scale development, (Record at 0590-0589); (4) the estimates of cost of 
constructing the required improvements are realistic, (Record at 0590-0589); and (5) tax 
liabilities of any reserved, common, open space have been determined. (Record at 0590-
0589).30 
On September 10, 1996 the Commission forwarded Plat # 2 of the disputed PUD 
to the Council without a recommendation that it be approved or disapproved. (Record at 
0317. )31 
30
 Springville Code § 11-4-202(10) provides that "[t]he Planning Commission will grant 
final approval after reviewing the final plan and accompanying documents ascertaining 
that: (a) The final plans conform substantially with those given preliminary approval, (b) 
The final plat complies with the requirements and standards relating to the applicable type 
of large-scale development, (c) The final documents and statements comply with the 
standards relating to the applicable type of large-scale development, (d) The estimates of 
cost of constructing the required improvements are realistic, (e) Tax liabilities of any 
reserved, common, open space have been determined." (Record at 0967.) A review of 
the minutes of the September 10, 1996 meeting (Record at 0741) indicates that no such 
findings were made. 
31
 Refusing to give a recommendation violates both Utah and Springville law. State 
law provides that "[t]he planning commission shall:... (5) recommend approval or denial 
of subdivision applications as provided in this chapter; (6) advise the legislative body on 
matters as the legislative body directs; . . . (8) exercise any other powers: (a) that are 
necessary to enable it to perform its function; or (b) delegated to it by the legislative body." 
§ 10-9-204 U.C.A. Required duties under the Springville Code are found in §§ 11-4-210, 
(Record at 0133), 11-5-8, (Record at 0132), 11-5-9 (Record at 0132) and 11-5-10(1) 
(Record at 1032). 
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On October 15, 1996, a motion was approved by the Council amending the 
conditions of preliminary approval that had been granted by the Council on July 16, 1996. 
(Record at 0692.) Among other things, the amendments allowed the development to be 
done in phases, eliminated the requirement that the spring protection area be designated 
as a public park, and required that the spring protection area be conveyed to the 
homeowners association as a common area. (Record at 0691.) 
The Council did not send to the Planning Commission for review, recommendation, 
or approval the amended conditions of preliminary approval that had been granted by the 
Council on October 15, 1996 or any action taken by the Council thereafter. (Record at 
0585. )32 
On November 5,1996, the modified, disputed PUD received tentative final approval 
by the Council without submission of the following: (1) documents tendering water rights 
to the City; (2) re-vegetation plan with approvals of the City Engineer, building inspector 
and the superintendent of public parks; (3) estimates of costs of construction of 
improvements; or (4) Documentation regarding any tax liability for any common area. 
(Record at 0583-0584.) The Council failed to ensure that the requirements of a PUD were 
32
 This conduct by the Council violated the Springville Code § 11-5-10(1) (Record at 
0247). Even if it was assumed arguendo that the non-action of the Commission on 
September 10,1996 constituted approval, the nine amendments adopted on October 15, 
1996 by the Council changed the conditions of preliminary approval (originally granted on 
July 16, 1996). Amendments ## 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 could not have been approved by the 
Commission because they did not exist at the time Plat # 2 was before the Commission. 
(Record at 0252-0251, 0248.) After their creation, the Commission never had a plat that 
involved the entire parcel before them. (Record at 0326.) 
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satisfied in that the disputed PUD was not "held and developed as a single entity" as 
required by City Code. (Record at 0414.)33 
On November 5, 1996, the Council made no findings that a variance could be 
granted regarding the following uses of land in Plat #2: (1) allowing streets to be made 
contrary to the standard widths and sidewalk requirements, (Record at 0584); (2) allowing 
two flag lots numbered # 1 and # 2 on the Plat # 2, (Record at 0584); (3) allowing for a 
building height of a maximum of thirty-nine feet, rather than the twenty feet from grade or 
two stories allowed in the RA-1-20,000 zone (as required by annexation), (Record at 
0584); (4) allowing two flag lots numbered # 34 and # 35 on the Plat # 1 area (which is not 
shown on Plats # 2, # 3 or # 4), (Record at 0584); (5) allowing lots 5, 6, 7 and 8 to have 
less than 20,000 square feet, (Record at 0583); (6) allowing development of a PUD that 
was not planned and developed as a single entity, (Record at 0583); and (7) allowing 
building lots in the H-1 (hillside) zone without conformance to PUD requirements, (Record 
at 0583.) M 
At the November 5, 1996 meeting, the disputed PUD shown by Plat #2 received 
tentative, final approval. (Record at 0671.) On November 19, 1996 the Council approved 
the City Ordinance 19-96 subject to numerous conditions before its recordation, including 
33
 This violates § 11-10-202(14) (Record at 0414-0415.) 
34
 Even though allowed by Springville Code, this requirement, however, may be illegal 
because of its conflict with state law which provides "[t]he board of adjustments shall hear 
and decide . . . (c) variances from the terms of the zoning ordinance." § 10-9-703(1 )(c) 
U.C.A. (emphasis added). 
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the tendering of the water shares and the filing of covenants, condition and restrictions. 
(Record at 0669.) 
4. Tendering of Water Rights and C.C.& R's 
On November 20,1996, the developer made a purported tender of water shares to 
Springville. The tender was in the form of a letter that stated: 
I, [Roger Peay] hereby turn over 13.5 shares of Highline Ditch 
water to the City of Springville, 11.75 shares for the Stonebury 
Estates PUD Plat A, and 1.75 shares for Maple Leaf Plat E. 
From my conversation with both Harold Mitchell and Bert 
Oakey, it is my understanding that the owners of these two 
developed lots can still use water from the Highline Ditch if they 
pay an annual assessment fee to the City which is 
commensurate with the acreage within each lot. I am turning 
over these water shares with this understanding and with the 
intention of providing water connections to the lots which are 
below the Highline Ditch. It will be the responsibility of each lot 
owner to work out the annual fee assessment with the City. 
(Record at 0223.) On November 25, 1996, the developer executed the covenants, 
conditions, and restrictions (C.C. & R.'s) for the disputed PUD. (Record at 0663.) The C.C. 
& R.'s specifically provide that "[n]o water rights are being conveyed with any lot." (Record 
at 0206. )35 
35
 This tender is invalid as a transfer of water rights, water shares or water. First and 
foremost, the developer had no right at this juncture to reserve or use the water in 
question. When the property was annexed into Springville in 1985, a condition of any 
future development of the property required "the conveyance to Springville City of six acre 
feet of water per acre per year, exclusive of any existing streets, prior to the granting of 
any approval for the development or the issuance of a building permit on the property by 
the city." (Record at 0478.) Had the water been tendered at the time of annexation, the 
water could have been used for irrigation purposes "until said land shall be developed for 
non-agricultural purposes, or until the City requires the use of said water for municipal or 
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The C.C. & R's also specifically provided the following: "[l]ot #3 shall be permitted 
two curb cuts to allow for the access easement for Lots # 1 and # 2." (Record at 0195); 
buildings may be built to a height of thirty-nine feet (39'). (Record at 0203); and any land 
that is owned or will be owned by the developer adjoining the disputed PUD may be added 
to the disputed PUD. (Record at 0183.) Each of these was in violation of the Springville 
Code. 
5. Recording Plat # 4 
The plat that was recorded with the county recorder is referred to as Plat # 4. 
(Record at 0177.) At the time of the recordation of the plat # 4 of the disputed PUD, 
several of the prerequisite conditions for recording had not been met. As noted heretofore, 
a proper tender of water had not occurred. A deed for the balance of the parkland in 
irrigation purposes within its water system." Springville Code § 11-7-402(4). (Record at 
0098). The water was not being used for irrigation purposes on the land; it had now been 
approved as a PUD and was no longer "prior to the granting of any approval for. . . 
development." Thus, the developer was required to convey "to the City water rights 
equivalent to a first class water right of Springville Irrigation Company for each of land 
within said development or park, exclusive of public streets." Springville Code § 11 -4-213; 
(Record at 0097); see also § 11 -5-23(1) (Record at 0130). He failed to do so. Second, 
the tendering of "Highline Ditch water" on November 20, 1996 by the developer is invalid 
because (a) there is no entity known as "Highline Ditch" that could issue shares; (b) even 
if there was, the actual shares would have to be tendered rather than just a statement 
regarding the same, see Sevy v. Security Title Company, 902 P.2d 629, 631 (Utah 1995), 
(c) the right of the City to use the water was reserved to those purchasing the lots, and (d) 
those lots below the ditch would receive connections to use the irrigation water. The plain 
letter of the Springville Code, and annexation requirements were not satisfied; the 
November 20,1997 tender was also contradicted by the subsequently filed C.C.& R. that 
stated "[n]o water rights are being conveyed with any lot." (Record at 0206.) For all of 
the foregoing, the tender of water in this instance was invalid as a matter of law and the 
City's acceptance of the same if not illegal, was arbitrary and capricious. 
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Phase II (the original area in the Plat that had received preliminary approval) had not been 
tendered or recorded. (Record at 91.) Even had the action or inaction of the Council and 
Commission been construed as the granting of the variances noted heretofore, the City 
failed to ensure that there was a listing from the requirements of City ordinances 
(variances) on the plat. (Record at 0177.) The City also failed to ensure that there was 
a transfer of the newly designated common area to a home owners association, lawfully 
incorporated under the laws of the State of Utah. (Record at 0156.) 
The recorded plat (Plat # 4) differed from any map that had been considered by the 
Commission and Council in three ways. First, Lot # 1 had been reconfigured on Plat # 2 
(that which received no action by the Commission) and Plat # 3 (that which was voted on 
for final approval by the Council) so as to make it appear that the earlier required 
conveyance by the developer to Springville of certain lands east of Lot # 1 would not need 
to be complied with because they were not included in the plat. However, contrary to the 
plat submitted to the Council for approval in recorded Plat # 4, Lot # 1 was reconfigured 
so that the land previously ordered to be conveyed to Springville was not conveyed to the 
City but included in Lot # 1. (Record at 0579.) Second, when read in conjunction with the 
C.C. & R's, Lots # 1 and # 2 became flag lots. (Record at 0195). Third, the purported 
Commission approval on the recorded plat was executed by a City official not in 
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attendance at the meeting and by an unknown person whose signature was later 
disavowed by the Commission Chairman as being his own. (Record at 0579. J36 
6. Appeal to the Board of Adjustment 
Condition # 6 of the amended conditions for approval of the disputed PUD, 
"required that the Highline Ditch be completely covered before any building permit was 
36
 While the trial court sua sponte rejected this fact (Record at 1131-1132), it was not 
disputed by the City. In the affidavit of Matthew Hilton accompanying Citizens' Rule 56(f) 
motion, the factual needs to take the deposition of Commission Chairman Steven Curtis 
was explained. (Record 1068.) Citizens were not aware of the possibility of a forged 
signature prior to March 7, 1996. (Record at 537-536.) Furthermore, on May 22, 1997 
Citizens made request in writing to counsel for Appellee to follow up an apparent earlier 
oral request to have contact with Steve Curtis in an effort to simplify matters and avoid a 
Rule 56(f) motion and subsequent deposition. (Record at 1178.) Counsel for the City had 
been given an extension of time to respond to Plaintiffs' motion of May 30, 1997. Counsel 
for Citizens did not receive the opposing memoranda from counsel for the City until the 
morning of June 3, 1997. (Record at 1069.) Argument in the case had been set for June 
6,1997, but after appearance of counsel in chambers was continued until June 17, 1997. 
(Record at 1082.) Because of these time constraints, the Rule 56(f) motion filed on June 
5, 1997 was not untimely. To submit a forged or altered document to a county recorder 
implicates felonious conduct see § 76-8-414 U.C.A. as well as a failure to have approval 
given, which failure could be used to void the entire plat. § 10-9-811(1) U.C.A. The 
reported statements of Steve Curtis tended to indicate such conduct could have occurred. 
Informal access to Mr. Curtis — Chairman of the City's Planning Commission but not a 
named litigation — had not been allowed by counsel for the City. (Record at 1178.) While 
not contesting the ultimate right of a trial court judge to reject sua sponte "undisputed facts" 
not objected to, see dicta in Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah 1985), 
Citizens suggest that surely when there is reported evidence of likely criminal conduct in 
municipal government, all of the evidence regarding such conduct is in control of the City, 
and efforts to have informal access to the most likely source of that information in that 
government was unsuccessful as late as fifteen days prior to the time set for oral 
argument, and at oral argument reference is made to the pending Ruel 56(f) motion, it was 
an abuse of discretion or not "just" under Rule 56(f) U.R.Civ.P. to fail to rule on the 56(f) 
motion, not allow Citizens' the right to proceed forward with the requested deposition, and 
prevent Defendant's motion for summary judgment from going forward until the deposition 
was taken. 
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issued." (Record at 0248.) On December 11, 1996, building permit number 03675 was 
issued in the disputed PUD. (Record at 0176.) As of January 6,1996, forty feet of pipe 
installation and the connecting box to the existing concrete ditch remained uncompleted. 
(Record at 0175.) On January 10, 1997, Citizen Debbie Bartholomew and Michael and 
LaRae Hill, among others, filed an appeal to the Board of Adjustment challenging the 
issuance of the building permit on the grounds that (1) the Highline Ditch pipe was not 
properly covered and (2) a proper tendering of water had not occurred. (Record at 0173.) 
Notwithstanding Springville and Utah law to the contrary, and the tendering of a letter 
explaining the basis for the appeal and a check for the $ 100.00 filing fee, (Record at 
0167), the City refused to allow this appeal challenging the issuance of a building permit 
to be heard.37 
On January 16,1997, Citizens Russel and Nancy Weiser, Michael and Linda Krau, 
and Debbie Bartholomew, among others, filed an appeal to the Board of Adjustment 
challenging Mayor Delora Bertelson's approval of and Hal Burrows' recording of Plat # 4 
on the grounds that (1) the water was not properly tendered, (2) there was no incorporation 
of a Homeowner's Association as required by the conditions of approval, and (3) there was 
no transfer of property to the Homeowner's Association. (Record at 0166.) On January 17, 
1997, Citizens David and Ruth Fuller and Keith and Joanne Haeffele, among others, filed 
an appeal to the Board of Adjustment challenging Mayor Delora Bertelson's approval of 
37
 By state law, the board of adjustments "shall hear and decide: (a) appeals from 
zoning decisions applying the zoning ordinances." § 10-9-703(1)(a) U.C.A. 
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and Hal Burrows recording of the plat of the disputed PUD on the grounds that (1) the 
water was not properly tendered, (2) there was no incorporation of a Homeowner's 
Association as required by the conditions of approval, and (3) there was no transfer of 
property to the Homeowner's Association. (Record at 0166.) Notwithstanding Springville 
and Utah law to the contrary, and the tendering of a letter explaining the basis for the 
appeal and a check for the $ 100.00 filing fee, (Record at 0149), the City refused to allow 
this appeal challenging the issuance of a building permit to be heard.38 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A government's duty to follow binding, mandatory law of any source creates a 
corresponding liberty interest in the citizens subject to that government and law. As the 
City violated mandatory municipal ordinances and statutes governing zoning and 
development of property, Citizens have a judicially enforceable property and liberty 
interest. By failing to comply with mandatory laws, the City violated Citizens' liberty 
interests recognized by the Springville Code, Utah Code, Utah Constitution and the United 
States Constitution. By allowing more lots to be established in the planned unit 
development than was allowed under mandatory laws and failing to enforce requirements 
regarding tendering of water and park-lands, the property rights of Citizens in their 
adjoining homes and neighborhoods were damaged. Interpreting and applying municipal 
and state laws provide a basis for issuing declaratory and injunctive relief in favor of 
38
 By state law, the board of adjustments "shall hear and decide: (a) appeals from 
zoning decisions applying the zoning ordinances." § 10-9-703(1 )(a) U.C.A. 
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Citizens. Interpreting and applying self-executing provisions of the Utah Constitution 
relating to an inherent and inalienable right to petition for redress of grievances (as it 
related to the Board of Adjustments and the City), due process and uniform application of 
the law justify allowing Citizens to submit evidence of damages, attorney fees and costs. 
Interpreting and applying the provisions of the First and Fourteenth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution also entitle Citizens on remand to submit evidence as to 
damages, attorney fees, and costs. All of the foregoing warrants reversing the trial court's 
granting of summary judgment for the City, granting of Citizens' motion for partial summary 
judgment as to declaratory and injunctive relief and liability, and remanding for evidence 
on damages, attorney fees and costs. 
VII. ARGUMENTS 
The arguments that follow are premised on three analytical assumptions favoring 
the interpretation and application of state law. First, by initially determining whether 
Citizens have property or liberty rights under city ordinances or state statutes, neither state 
nor federal constitution provisions are unnecessarily interpreted until rights are established 
that merit their protection. Second, on grounds of federalism, practicality, and defining 
with particularity the constitutional protections available to state residents willing to 
exercise their inherent and inalienable freedoms, state constitutional claims should be 
examined, and if possible, used to resolve claims before reliance is had on the federal 
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constitution. Following this framework of analysis is particularly important when Citizens 
are seeking (1) declaratory, injunctive and financial relief under a state constitutional law 
provision that can be interpreted to afford more protection than the federal constitution's 
counterpart40 and (2) protection of an identified inherent and inalienable right specifically 
identified in the Utah Constitution, the type of rights had their original recognition in the 
Declaration of Independence and state constitutions, but not the originally adopted, pre-
incorporation 1789 federal constitution. 
ARGUMENT I: CITIZENS HAVE ENFORCEABLE LIBERTY INTERESTS 
THAT WERE DAMAGED BY THE CITY'S CONDUCT 
A government's duty to follow binding, mandatory law of any source creates a 
corresponding, enforceable liberty interest in the citizens subject to that government and 
law. Citizens are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief to see that their liberties are 
protected and mandatory law enforced by the City. In addition, Citizens were damaged 
the City's failure to fulfill its duty to protect their liberties. 
39
 "As a matter of logic, the proper sequence is to analyze the state's law,.including its 
constitutional law, before reaching a federal constitutional claim. This is required, not for 
the sake of either parochialism or of style, but because the state does not deny any right 
claimed under the federal Constitution when the claim before the court in fact is fully met 
by state law. . . . By looking first to state constitutional principles, we also act in 
accordance with the original purpose of the federal system.... Prior to the incorporation 
of the Bill of Rights, state constitutions were the only source of protection for individual 
rights and have continued as important sources of rights ever since." West v. Thomson 
Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1006 (Utah 1994). 
40
 As to uniform operation of laws and equal protection, see Mountain Fuel Supply v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988); Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 
(Utah 1984). 
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A. The City Has A Legal Duty to Follow Mandatory Law 
In 1984, this Court instructed the City of Springville regarding its duty to follow 
mandatory law. 
In effect, appellant [City of Springville] is suggesting that actions violating the 
plain language of a zoning ordinance should be condoned. This result is 
unacceptable. 
This Court in Thurston v. Cache County, Utah, 626 P.2d 440, 444-445 
(1981), said: "County zoning authorities are bound by the terms and 
standards of the applicable zoning ordinance, and are not at liberty either to 
grant or deny conditional use permits in derogation of legislative standards." 
(Citations omitted.) 
The material evidence adduced in this case indicated that the city authorities 
disregarded the zoning ordinance and acted in derogation thereof. In light 
of that evidence, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the 
injunction.41 
The City itself recognizes this duty by the explicit language in the Springville Code that 
recognizes the use of the "[w]ords 'shall' and 'must' are always mandatory."42 
Springville is not alone in being required to honor the liberty interests of its own 
citizens and having to follow its own mandatory ordinances. In 1997, the Utah Court of 
Appeals found that the City of Draper was similarly bound by mandatory language in 
municipal ordinances; "it cannot change the rules halfway through the game."43 Even 
when Draper City claimed in hindsight that their rules imposed too great of administrative 
41
 Harris v. Springville, 712 P.2d 188, 189 (1984). 
42
 § 11 -10-101 (4) (Record at 0123). 
43
 Brendle v. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
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burdens on the city staff or failed to allow flexibility in the administration of the rules, 
applying the "plain and usual meaning" to the word "shall," the Court of Appeals found that 
the meaning of the word is that of "command" or mandatory in nature.44 
Springville is similarly not alone in having to follow the requirements of state 
statutes. While a City Council "may enact a zoning ordinance establishing regulations for 
land use and development that furthers the intent of [state law],"45 and its regulations may 
be more stringent than those required by state law,46 this discretion does not give a City 
the option to act outside of the "authority" given to it pursuant to state law even when 
interpreting the authorizations as containing both express and implied powers.47 As 
recently as 1997, the Utah Court of Appeals found that the actions of the Board of 
Adjustments of Salt Lake City were reversed because either the conduct was "illegal 
because the Board failed to make the' statutory findings," or even if Salt Lake Board of 
Adjustments had made the findings without articulating the same, the Board's decision was 
"arbitrary and capricious because it was not supported by substantial evidence."48 
Springville is likewise not alone in having to follow the requirements of the Utah 
constitution either. Because of the "supremacy clause" in Utah's constitution, actions of 
44
 Id. at 1048, 1047. 
45
 §10-9-401 U.C.A. 
46
 § 10-9-104(1) U. C. A. 
47
 Triangle Oil, Inc. v. North Salt Lake Corporation, 609 P.2d 1338, 1339 -1340 (1980). 
48
 Wells v. Board of Adjustment, 936 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) 
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municipalities that violate state statutory provisions also violate Utah's constitution. There 
is no analogous federal doctrine of "incorporation" of constitutional protections regarding 
municipal as compared to state conduct;49 the Utah constitutional provisions restrict the 
conduct of the City. Raising state constitutional violations is appropriate when 
challenging actions of a municipality in trial court.50 
The federal protections afforded under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 also afford Citizens a right 
to seek enforcement of their rights. This is true for violation of both liberty51 and property52 
49
 "This rationale has no application in construing the provisions of a state constitution. 
In construing a state constitution containing its own rather complete 'bill of rights,' it is 
wholly unnecessary to view a due process guaranty as connoting other rights when those 
rights are explicitly set forth in the same document." Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 566 
n.22 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
50
 Brendle v. City of Draper, supra, 937 P.2d at 1048-1049. 
51
 "[A] state law may create a liberty interest that cannot be denied without offending 
due process principles." Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1460 (10th Cir. 1995), cert, 
denied 517 U.S. 1035 (1996). "[A]ny rights, if they exist, are dependent on our finding 
that state law has created in plaintiffs an interest substantial enough to rise to the level of 
a "liberty interest" protected by the federal constitution." Montero v. Meyer, 13 F.3d 1444, 
1446 (10th Cir. 1994), cert, denied 513 U.S. 888 (1994). "Simply stated, a statute creates 
a protected liberty interest by placing substantive limitations on official discretion." 
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 451 (1989) 
52
 "To sustain their cause of action under § 1983, then, appellants must first allege a 
property interest sufficient to warrant due process protection. . .A property interest 
protected by the due process clause results from a legitimate claim of entitlement created 
and defined "by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source, 
such as state law."... When analyzing whether a plaintiff presents a legitimate claim of 
entitlement, we focus on the degree of discretion given the decision maker and not the 
probability of the decision's favorable outcome Appellants must therefore 
demonstrate that there is a set of conditions the fulfillment of which would give rise to a 
legitimate expectation. . . . Otherwise, the city's decision making lacks sufficient 
substantive limitations to invoke due process guarantees." Jacobs, Vosconsi & Jacobs Co. 
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interests. The mandatory legal requirements that existed at the time the disputed PUD 
received preliminary approval, the issuance of the grading permit, the granting of final 
approval, and the recordation of Plat # 4 all establish sufficient "substantive limitation" to 
invoke federal constitutional protections. This is true whether Springville ordinances, state 
statutes, or applicable constitutional provisions are used. 
B. Damages Arising From Violation of Liberty Interests 
As Citizens' have enforceable liberty interests in mandatory law, they are entitled 
to damages arising from the violation of these rights when constitutional provisions are 
violated. The Utah constitutional provisions at issue in this case are either self-executing 
or have been given necessary additional meaning by relevant legislation.53 Citizens 
contend that there is no principled basis to distinguish between using (1) self-executing 
or otherwise enforceable constitutional provisions to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief 
against government, and (2) using the same provisions to award damages against 
V. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111, 1115-1116 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted.) 
53
 "Courts have developed a concept of self-execution as a means of determining 
whether a constitutional provision may be enforced without implementing legislation. A 
constitutional provision is self-executing if it articulates a rule sufficient to give effect to the 
underlying rights and duties intended by the framers.. . .In other words, courts may give 
effect to a provision without implementing legislation if the framers intended the provision 
to have immediate effect and if 'no ancillary legislation is necessary to the enjoyment of 
a right given, or the enforcement of a duty imposed.' . . . . In addition, the fact that the 
legislature may enact supplementary legislation to further protect or regulate a right in a 
constitutional provision does not prevent the provision from being self-executing. . . 
.Conversely, constitutional provisions are not self-executing if they merely indicate a 
general principle or line of policy without supplying the means for putting them into effect." 
Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 737 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted.) 
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government. As this Court has upheld awarding damages against governmental officials 
who acted contrary to constitutional law and injured prison inmates, law abiding Citizens 
who similarly depend on the City to provide information, protect rights, and follow existing 
law, should likewise be allowed to seek damages against the City for violating applicable 
state constitutional law. To do otherwise creates a two-tiered system of justice that 
provides those in prison by reason of their criminal conduct with greater constitutional 
protections against damage suffered at the hands of government than the protections 
afforded law abiding citizens that are damaged by the City's efforts to thus far thwart the 
exercise of their inherent and inalienable rights protected by the Utah constitution.54 
1. Violation of State Statutory Provisions and 
Supremacy Clause of State Constitution 
Actions of municipalities that violate state law are "unconstitutional under the 
supremacy clause contained in Utah Const. Art. XI, § 5."55 When the statutes exist and 
conflict with municipal law, the supremacy provision may be applied and enforced as if the 
provision was self-executing. There are at least three state statutory provisions that were 
violated by the City's approval of the disputed PUD. 
54
 Of course, having demonstrated deprivation of a municipal or state created liberty 
interest and property right, and damages arising therefrom, if this Court found no damages 
are recoverable under state constitutional provisions, Citizens are entitled to seek recovery 
as well under the relevant provisions of federal statutory and constitutional law already 
noted previously. 
55
 Davis County v. Clearfield, 756 P.2d 704, 712 n.10 (Utah Ct. App.) cert, denied 765 
P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988), referring to Allgood v. Larson, 545 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1976). 
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First, by engaging in the practice of granting variances, the Council not only 
violated the provisions of the Springville ordinance that empowered the Board of 
Adjustments to do so56, but acted in direct conflict with the statutory requirements that 
provide u[t]he Board of Adjustment shall hear and decide. . . variances from the terms of 
the zoning ordinances."57 
Second, when the Commission failed to forward Plat # 2 to the Council with a 
recommendation, the Commission not only failed to follow numerous Springville 
ordinances requiring their affirmative action but also violated statutory requirements.58 
This failure — in and of itself — should have made it impossible to lawfully file or record 
the plat of the disputed PUD because there had been no "recommendation . . . received 
from the planning commission."59 
Third, because the failure of the municipal staff to obey the ministerial requirements 
imposed by the City Council prior to the recordation of the plat — such as properly 
tendering water, recording of (lawful) CC&R.'s, incorporating of a Homeowner's 
Association, and transferring the common area to the Homeowner's Association — the 
recordation was illegal or arbitrary and capricious in that there was no authorization to do 
§ 11-3-628 (Record at 0294-0293) 
§10-9-703 U. C. A 
§§ 10-9-204(3), (5), (6), (7) and (8) U.C.A. 
§10-9-805(7.0. A 
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so because there was no evidence of lawful compliance with these conditions. "A plat of 
a subdivision recorded without the approval of the governing body . . . is void."60 
2. Violation of Protections Afforded By Due Process of Law 
"One of our most important constitutional guarantees is that no person may be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."61 It is appropriate to apply 
the concept of due process under the Utah Constitution to Citizens' claims.62 
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
[t]he phrase 'due process of law' apparently originated in our judicial 
parlance with Lord Coke, who in construing the language of the Magna Carta 
That no man shall be taken or imprisoned — or deprived of life, liberty or 
property but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land,' which 
definition is the language used in our constitution. . . . The term law of the 
land' embraces all legal and equitable rules which define human rights and 
duties, and provides for their protection and enforcement, both as between 
the state and its citizen, and between man and man. And the 'due process 
of \aW includes the steps essential under such rules to deprive a person of 
60
 §10-9-811 (1) (b)UCA 
61
 State ex. rel. Summers v. Wulffenstein, 616 P.2d 608, 610 (Utah 1980). 
62
 Despite the same language in the federal constitution and modern Utah precedent 
that concluded federal decisions were highly persuasive to the application of the Utah 
constitution's clause, the analytical framework that is appropriately used to interpret the 
phrase in the Utah constitution is fundamentally different. First, the judicial doctrine of 
selective "incorporation" used by the United States Supreme Court to impose on state 
governments restrictions originally intended only for federal laws is not applicable because 
from its inception all of the provisions of the Utah Constitution were intended to serve as 
constraints on state government. Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552, 566 n.22 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). Second, this Court is under no obligation to merely copy any federal analytical 
model so long as the Utah Constitution meets or exceeds the federal requirements. See 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780-784 (Utah 1991). Third, this court cannot "shrink our 
duty to find an act of [the City] unconstitutional when it clearly appears that it conflicts with 
some provision of our Constitution." Matheson v. Ferry, 641 P.2d 674, 679 (Utah 1982) 
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life, or liberty. It covers the means and methods that are prescribed or may 
be employed to accomplish the purposes of the law. Jenkins v. Ballantyne, 
8 Utah 245, 30 P. 760, . . . In proper cases the purposes of the law, 
especially as to property, may be effected by executive or administrative 
action, and still be valid if they meet the requirements of due process."63 
Relying on numerous federal cases, the Utah Supreme Court has defined property 
interests subject to "due process" protection as follows: 
Property' interests subject to procedural due process protection are not 
limited by a few rigid, technical forms. Rather 'property' denotes a broad 
range of interests that are secured by 'existing rules or understanding.'. . . 
It is a purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims 
upon which rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily 
undermined. It is a purpose of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide 
an opportunity for a person to vindicate those claims.64 
Analogizing to the property interest in licensure, the property rights of Citizens surely merit 
protection. 
Inasmuch as [their home] does represent a substantial property interest. . 
. which also has its effect upon the pubic welfare, it should not be destroyed 
nor disrupted arbitrarily, not without following fundamental standards of due 
process of law to guard against capricious or oppressive administrative 
action.65 
The judicial challenge is to determine what degree of due process is required under the 
Utah Constitution in a particular situation. This is challenging at times because 
63
 Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 316 (Utah 1945). 
64
 Celebrity Club Incorporated v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 657 P.2d 1293, 
1296-1297 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). 
65
 Anderson v. Utah County Board of Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 
1979). 
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'due process' is not a technical concept that can be reduced to a formula 
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances. Rather, 'the 
demands of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of procedure 
and demand a procedure appropriate to the case and the parties involved.'66 
Were the City to adhere to due process, the Citizens would be treated fairly. "Fairness 
requires not only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility 
of unfairness."67 Failing to follow mandatory law surely suggests the possibility of 
unfairness. This is particularly the case when the City has already a prior history of not 
only failing to follow mandatory law, arguing that such conduct was lawful.68 
As an example, by failing to provide the mandatory information prior to public 
hearings on the disputed PUD, the City has overlooked " the very heart of procedural 
fairness,"69 because it failed "to give adequate notice and opportunity to participate."70 The 
66
 In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 {Utah 1996) (citations omitted.) 
67
 Bunnell v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah 1987) (citation 
omitted.) 
68
 See Harris v. Springville, supra, footnote 41. Thus, the City is in a position similar to 
that of an administrative law judge that apparently had not learned the rules of basic 
fairness. "We do not think that due process requires procedures that endeavor to avoid 
the appearance of unfairness only in cases in which the judge also acted as counsel for 
one of the parties (the situation in Anderson); rather, we think that due process demands 
a new trial when the appearance of unfairness is so plain that we are left with the abiding 
impression that a reasonable person would find the hearing unfair. It is perhaps instructive 
that the administrative law judge whose conduct was in question in Anderson was also the 
judge in this case. We fear the reasoning employed by the dissent will encourage the 
impression that our decisions are merely "horatory" and will not be enforced." Bunnell v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, supra, 740 P.2d at 1333. 
69
 In re Worthen, 926 P.2d 853, 876 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
70
 Plumb v. State, 809 P.2d 734, 743 (Utah 1990). 
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City "did not accord [Citizens] a reasonable opportunity to obtain and present relevant 
evidence and their contentions thereon as to the critical issues [at the public hearing or 
Board of Adjustments] and thus did not accord them due process of law."71 These 
opportunities are, at a minimum, defined and implemented by the City's own Code. 
Due process of law in each particular case means such an exercise of the 
powers of the government as the settled maxims of law permit and sanction, 
and under such safeguards for the protection of individual rights as those 
maxims prescribe for the class of cases to which the one in question 
belongs.72 
One way of fulfilling all "maxims prescribed for a class of cases" is to comply with all of the 
steps required by municipal or state law.73 
While perhaps "certain aspects of due process may be waived, they must be waived 
under the proper circumstances and with knowledge."74 "[W]hether there has been an 
intelligent waiver [of mandatory filings and adherence to municipal and state code ] . . . . 
depend[s] upon the facts and circumstances of each case, including [Citizens non-lawyer]] 
71
 Utility Consumer Action Group v. Public Service Commission, 583 P.2d 605, 608 
(Utah 1978) (footnote omitted). 
72
 Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Center, Inc., 446 P.2d 958, 965 (Utah 1968) 
(footnote omitted). 
73
 In response to a challenge from deprivation of children by the Juvenile Court without 
"due process of law," the Utah Supreme Court found "the record in this case is a complete 
answer to appellants' contention. All steps required by the provisions of Title 55, Chapter 
10, U.C.A. 1953 were complied with." In re State ex. rel Black, 283 P.2d 887, 894 (Utah 
1955) cert, denied Black v. Utah, 350 U.S. 923 (1955). 
74
 State v. Peterson, 681 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah 1984). 
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. . . background, experience and conduct"75 The failure of the City to implement "sound 
and fair" procedures may well violate "due process of law" under Article I § 7 of the Utah 
Constitution.76 Because no appeal to the Board of Adjustments was allowed by the City, 
the existence of post-conduct hearing procedures can not used as to justify a previous 
failure to provide due process of law.77 
3. Violations of Protections Afforded by the Right to Petition 
for Redress of Grievance 
The uncontested evidence in the record shows that the City failed to have the 
required information from the developer regarding the PUD available to the public, prior 
to public hearings, held the same night that preliminary approval was granted. While the 
ground work for the formulation of twenty-nine additional stipulations and conditions to this 
PUD was likely worked on by staff and others prior to the meeting, the failure to have the 
information available surely limited what little input was allowed the public at that time. 
This is particularly damaging from Citizens' perspective since the granting of preliminary 
approval is tantamount to a contract between the City and the developer allowing for future 
development subject to the conditions imposed by the preliminary approval.75 Even after 
the Citizens sought to point out violations of mandatory law to the City Council members 
75
 State v. Spiers, 361 P.2d 509, 509 (Utah 1961). 
76
 State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1981). 
77
 Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 340 (Utah 1980). 
78
 See § 11-4-202(8) (Record at 0967). 
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in written correspondence prior to the granting of an amended final approval, they were 
unable to address other major issues because of the failure to require the filing of 
mandatory documents such as the C.C.& R's (that as recorded contained provisions in 
violation of the City Code and conditions relating to flag lots and height of buildings), 
tendering of water, incorporation of a home owners association, and conveyance of a 
common area to the association. 
Another area of uncontested evidence shows that the City refused to allow the 
Citizens' appeal to go forward before the Board of Adjustment. By state statute, 
(i) The applicant or any other person or entity adversely affected by a 
decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance may appeal the 
decision applying the zoning ordinance by alleging that there is an error in 
any order, requirement, decision, or determination made by an official in the 
administration or interpretation of the zoning ordinance. 
(ii) The legislative body shall enact an ordinance establishing a reasonable 
time for appeal to the board of adjustment of decisions administering or 
interpreting a zoning ordinance.79 
The City, in fact, adopted an ordinance providing for such a right, whether a person was 
the applicant or not.80 By failing to follow in practice the City ordinance and state statute 
allowing all persons to appeal to the Board of Adjustment when a City official either fails 
79 § 10-9-704(1 )(a) U. C. A 
80
 "Appeals to the Board of Adjustment may be taken by any person or entity adversely 
affected by an officer, department, board, or bureau of the City affected by any decision 
of the Zoning Administrator or other administrative officer or agency in administration or 
interpretation of the Zoning ordinance An appeal stays all proceedings in furtherance 
of the action appealed from § 11-2-305(1), (2). (Record at 0129) 
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to perform a ministerial task or interprets a zoning ordinance improperly, the City has 
damaged the Citizens (1) by not allowing them the benefit of an automatic stay that would 
have issued under City ordinances, and (2) increased their expense, time and damages 
incurred while seeking judicial review. (Record at 0566-0564). All of these infringements 
merit injunctive, declaratory and monetary relief. 
This Court has encouraged enforcement of natural or inherent and inalienable rights 
by reference to the text of Utah's constitution81 or a long-standing social recognition of the 
fundamental or basic nature of the right.82 While it may well be that the floor debates of 
the framers' of Utah's constitution did not offer specific insight into the practical breadth 
of this right in their floor debates,83 the state and municipal law upholding this right84 as 
well as the constitutional text uphold the right of the Citizens to "assemble peaceably [at 
Council and Commission meetings], protested] against wrongs [at the one public hearing 
81
 Utah Const., Art. I, § 1. Unlike Utah v. Gardner, 947 P.2d 630, 637 (Utah 1997), 
mandatory statutes and ordinances must be enforced precisely because of the express 
text of Article I § 1 of the Utah Constitution. Citizens are asserting an "interest that rises 
to the level of a fundamental life or liberty interest protected by this constitutional 
provision." Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission, 945 P.2d 125, 138 (Utah 1997). 
82
 In re J.P., 648 P.2d 1364, 1372-1374 (Utah 1982). 
83
 See Official Report of the Proceedings and Debates of the Convention, Vol. I at 229-
230. 
84
 Another reference in the Code justifies recognition of a right to "petition" the board 
of adjustments: those who have been denied a request by a board of adjustment "may 
petition the board of adjustment to stay its decision"before proceeding with a "petition" to 
district court. See § 10-9-708(7)(b) U.C.A. 
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and by letter to Council members], and petitioned] for redress of grievances" to the 
Springville Board of Adjustments. 
A comparison of Utah's textual references to this right with other state constitutions 
or significant interpretation of the same indicate at least four reasons why the Utah 
constitutional provision regarding petitioning for redress of grievances needs to be 
interpreted so as to apply to Citizens' claims. First, unlike any other state, the text of 
Utah's definition specifically identifies in the same paragraph that this right is among those 
that are "inherent and inalienable." Second, the text of Utah's language is not restricted 
to matters associated with the state legislature.85 Third, the presence of existing Utah 
statutes and Springville ordinances protecting Citizens right to appeal to the municipal 
board of adjustment necessarily rejects restrictive case law from other states that restrict 
the right to simply allowing presentment of a petition or remonstrance regarding past or 
85
 See, for example, Idaho Const. Art. I § 20 ("The people shall have the right to 
assemble in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good; to instruct their 
representatives, and to petition the legislature for the redress of their grievances."); N.H. 
Const. Pt. I Art. § 32 ("The people have a right, in an orderly and peaceable manner, to 
assemble and consult upon the common good, give instructions to their representatives, 
and to request of the legislative body, by way of petition or remonstrance, redress of 
wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer."); Ohio Const. I § 3 ("The people 
have the right to assemble together, in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common 
good; to instruct their representatives; and to petition the general assembly for the redress 
of grievances.") Va. Const. Art. 20 ("That the people have a right to assemble together to 
consult for their common good — to instruct their Representatives — and to apply to the 
Legislature for redress of grievances, by address, petition, or remonstrance."). 
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future government action86 and does not require government to give a response.87 Fourth, 
case law does not preempt state interpretation by adherence to the federal.88 
4. Violations of Protections Afforded by the Right to 
Uniform Operation of the Law 
Citizens also have uncontested evidence in the record that the City had previously 
required all PUDs to have common areas and be developed as one unit. This was not 
done with the disputed PUD. This failure not only allowed recording of Plat # 4 without the 
benefit of receiving the easements and transfers of property required by Plat # 1, but by 
allowing split development to occur, Springville failed to follow its own definition of what 
constituted a PUD. If this were not a PUD, all H-1 (hillside) development would have been 
stopped. All of this damaged the Citizens' right to receive the benefit of the uniform 
application of the law.89 
Furthermore, Citizens (as adjoining landowners) also have a fundamental right to 
equal treatment given by the City to landowners when petitioning for redress of grievances 
to the Board of Adjustments as noted heretofore. By allowing the practices of a City to 
make an artificial distinction among those who are impacted by the interpretation of a 
86
 Pierkarski v. Smith, 153 A.2d 587 (Del. 1959). 
87
 Ga. Const. Art. I § 1, Para. IX , as interpreted in Richter v. Harris, 7 S.E.2d 432 
(1940); Mont. Const. Art. II § 6, as interpreted in Gehring v. Members of 1993 Legislature, 
889 P.2d 1164 (Mont. 1995); Georgia; Montana 
88
 Hunt v. McNair, 187 SE 2d 645 (S.C. 1972) affirmed 413 U.S. 734 (1973). 
89
 Utah Const. Art. I § 24. The federal counterpart, offering a lesser standard of 
protection, is the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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zoning ordinance (owner of the land subject to the zoning ordinance versus owners of 
adjoining lands that are impacted by the application or interpretation of the zoning 
ordinance) not only denies Citizens uniform operation of the law but, being irrational and 
an infringement on First Amendment rights, also violates both the rational basis and strict 
scrutiny standard of review under the United States constitution. 
All of the foregoing damages of Citizens' liberty interests merits reversal of the trial 
court's ruling and remand for computation of damages, attorney fees, and costs. 
ARGUMENT II: CITIZENS' HAVE ENFORCEABLE PROPERTY RIGHTS 
THAT WERE DAMAGED BY THE CONDUCT OF THE CITY 
The Citizens have enforceable property rights that were damaged by the City 
actions. Some of these rights and damages are unique to Citizens; some rights and 
damages affect Citizens and all other residents of Springville City. Citizens are entitled 
to present evidence of these damages in a trial court. 
A. Rights and Damages Unique to Citizens 
It is undisputed that 
Citizens are individual residents of Springville and property owners who live 
the area immediately adjoining, or adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the PUD 
and are impacted by reason of the disputed development more than general 
residents of Springville because of, among other things, anticipated matters 
of traffic flow, projected and actual devaluation of their property, water run-
off, potential and actual mudslides, and past and future disruption of 
irrigation water flow. 
(Record at 0606.) The property interests had been subjected to actual devaluation, actual 
mudslides and disruption of water flow by the time the trial court heard argument on this 
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case. Obviously, less lots in the disputed PUD would result in less damages to the 
Citizens. (The amount of that damages arising from excessive lots had been reserved for 
future determination.) Based on the foregoing, Citizens had a unique property interest that 
they were entitled to protect.90 There are at least four illustrations of how actions taken by 
the City allowed more lots in the PUD than would have been possible under existing 
mandatory law. 
1. Plat # 1 with thirty-five (35) lots was submitted as an entire PUD for preliminary 
approval. There was no "common area" on the plat. All prior planned unit developments 
in Springville were developed as a single unit and had a common area.91 After preliminary 
approval was granted to Plat # 1, the developer proposed Plat # 2 for final approval 
seeking to develop only seventeen of the thirty-five lots at this time. Neither Plat # 2 nor 
the recorded Plat # 4 had a common area. Thus, neither the plat granted final approval 
(Plat # 2) nor that which was recorded (Plat # 4) followed the prior history or definitional 
requirements of a PUD as to single development or a common area. Without a planned 
unit development, there could be no development in the H-1 (hillside) zone. Thus, all lots 
located in the H-1 zone would not be allowed.92 
90
 See §§ 10-9-1001(2); 10-9-1002(1) U.C.A. 
91
 See Record at 1076-1071. 
92
 The recorded Plat # 4 (seventeen lots in Phase 1) includes two lots in the H-1 zone. 
Plat # 1 that was given preliminary approval for the complete development of thirty-five 
lots includes four lots in the H-1 zone. 
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2. On July 16, 1996, at the time preliminary approval was given to Plat # 1, the 
eighth condition imposed by the City was that the PUD would have no flag lots. (Record 
at 0396.) On October 15,1996, when Plat # 2 was before the Council for final approval, 
the Council amended their required conditions to allow two flag lots in the area of lots thirty 
three to thirty-five. (Record at 0248). Without the recommendation of the Commission or 
action by the Board of Adjustments, the Council's unilateral conduct violated mandatory 
provisions of the Springville Code and Utah statutory law.93 
3. When final approval was given to Plat # 2 and the C.C.& R's accepted, (Record 
at 0195), the City improperly allowed lots 1 and 2 to have a "flag lot" access (Record at 
0568). This violated the eighth condition of the City's July 16,1996 preliminary approval 
(Record 0396) and the Council's reaffirmance of the same on October 15, 1996. (Record 
at 0248). If the allowance of two flag lots was done as a variance, it violated both the 
Springville Code and Utah law.94 
93
 As it relates to flag lots, the Board of Adjustments (not the City Council) is specifically 
empowered as the governmental body that would approve deep lot development. (§ 11 -3-
628). (Record at 294-293). If allowing flag lots is considered to be a variance, the 
Springville Code allows variances to be made by the Council after recommendation from 
the Commission and the Council makes specific findings and recommendations. The 
variance shall be stated on the plat. (§ 11-4-215) (Record 0300). In this case, no 
recommendation was made by the Commission, no findings were made by the Council to 
justify its changed conditions on October 15,1996, and no variances were stated on either 
Plat # 2 or Plat # 4. Even had this procedure been followed, it would be invalid as it 
clearly conflicts with state statute that provides that only the Board of Adjustments may 
grant variances. See § 10-9-703 U.C.A. 
94
 Id. 
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4. The illegal issuance of the grading permit and development of a permanent road 
prior to proper engineering being completed, and final approval given, allowed final 
approval of lots 5-8 with less than 20,000 square feet because to have done otherwise 
would have required the road to be moved and contribute to more scarring of the hillside. 
(Record at 0315-0313.) Had the designated area been properly developed in accordance 
with the requirements of annexation, (Record at 0478), the four lot area would have been 
approved as three. 
5. Whether as a PUD or large scale development, by granting illegal variances to 
City requirements on street widths and the like (Record 0584), the City allowed for 
additional acreage to be used in the PUD for developing at least one more lot. 
Thus, in summary, whether talking about the PUD as a development of thirty-five 
lots or solely as seventeen, had the City had followed mandatory law, at a minimum the 
following reduction in the number of lots would have occurred: 
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Table I 
Reduction of Number of Lots 
Source of Reduction 35-Lot Development 17-Lot Development 
of Lots (Plat#1) (Plat #4) 
H-1 (Hillside) Zone -4 -2 
Illegal flag lots -4 -2 
Illegal Excavation of Road -1 -1 
Minimum for Street Variances -1 -1 
Total Lot Reduction £LQ S 
Remaining PUD lots 25 11 
Percentage Reduction in 
Number of PUD lots 29% 35% 
As adjoining land and home owners to the approved PUD, Citizens had a distinct 
and defineable property interest in protecting their homes and neighborhoods from an 
increase of a third more traffic, noise, mud-slides and other related damage that need not 
have occurred had the City followed mandatory law. Citizens are entitled to present 
evidence of these damages in a trial court. 
B. Rights and Damages Shared By Citizens With Other Municipal Residents 
In addition to damages arising from an increase in the number of lots, Citizens, like 
other Springville residents, have been damaged by the City's failure to follow mandatory 
law and ensure their receipt of (1) required park or recreation areas and (2) water shares. 
This can be shown in three ways. 
1. When the final approval was given, and Plat # 4 eventually recorded, there was 
no dedication of the park easement to the City in Phase 1 or any dedication in Phase II 
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(Record at 0576), all as required by prior action of the Council and city ordinance, and all 
to the detriment of the Citizens who would be denied public access to a jogging and/or bike 
trail. 
2. When Plat # 4 was recorded, it failed to follow the reconfiguration of Lot # 1 
shown on Plat # 2, therefore violating the condition of deeding the triangular-piece of 
property in question to the City, thereby eliminating additional area for the jogging and/or 
bike trail. (Record at 0579). 
3. By failing to require the tendering of water to occur in a manner that satisfied 
legal requirements and drew from the water in the Highline Ditch, the City has placed at 
risk many of the Citizens' water in the Highline Ditch and has further drained the available 
water and other resources for the city population. (Record at 0567) 
Because these property damages have occurred, Citizens are entitled to present 
evidence of these damages to a trial court. 
ARGUMENT III. CITIZENS HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEEK DECLARATORY, 
INJUNCTIVE AND MONETARY RELIEF AGAINST THE CITY 
The Citizens filed in trial court seeking redress for their wrongs. They found no 
justice or equity regarding their claims of wrongdoing by the City. On appeal, the Citizens 
request that this Court grant them the redress they had previously sought in the trial court. 
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A. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Are Available Under Statutory Provisions 
The trial court was empowered by state statute to grant Citizens relief against the 
City if Springville's conduct was illegal, arbitrary or capricious.95 The trial court failed to 
do so. ( Significant issues — such as the changes between Plat # 2 and # 3 that had been 
approved and Plat # 4 that was recorded or the failure to properly tender water — were not 
even addressed by the trial court.) Based on the record before this Court, this Court may 
properly grant the injunctive and declaratory relief sought by Citizens. 
In the face of a voluminous, undisputed recounting of failures to follow mandatory 
state and federal law, the trial court was in error when it refused to find for Citizens 
because of the statutory presumption that Springville's "land use decisions and regulations 
were valid".96 The very statutory ability to challenge the City's actions on grounds of 
illegality or as being arbitrary or capricious97 means that the presumption of validity 
afforded zoning decisions and administration is subject to rebuttal, that the presumption 
is not conclusive or determinative when faced with clear evidence to the contrary in a 
summary judgment setting. "Where statutory language is plain and unambiguous, this 
Court will not look beyond to divine legislative intent. . . . [A] statute should be construed 
95
 § 10-9-1001 (3)(b) U.C.A. The Citizens pointed out that much of the City's illegal 
conduct necessarily meant that such conduct was per se arbitrary and capricious or that 
the failure to comply with submission of needed evidence meant there was no evidence 
upon which findings could be made and was, therefore, arbitrary and capricious. (Record 
at 0565-0563). 
96
 See § 10-9-1001 (3)(a) U.C.A. 
97See10-9-1001(3)(b)l/C.A 
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according to its plain language."98 "A general rule of statutory construction is that a 
statute should be construed as a comprehensive whole. . . .In construing legislative 
enactments, we assume that the legislature used each term advisedly and, thus, that we 
should read the statutory words literally . . . ."" "'[S]pecific statutes control over more 
general ones.'"100 
The application of the doctrine of "substantial compliance" to rescue the City from 
its own mistakes is similarly in error. The precedent involving the City itself before this 
Court in 1984 and the two recent 1997 Utah Court of Appeals cases with Salt Lake City 
and the City of Draper affirm that such a doctrine has no place when overlooking 
mandatory ordinances, statutes, and constitutional provisions. 
B. The Constitutional Provisions Relied Upon for Damages 
Are Applicable 
While the general concept of natural or inherent and inalienable rights have 
generally required articulation in the text of Utah's constitution to be enforceable, the 
identification of the right to "petition for a redress of grievance" is specifically protected.101 
98
 State of Utah v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1228 (Utah 1997) (citation omitted). 
99
 Zissi v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 842 P.2d 848, 854 (Utah 1992) (citations 
omitted). 
100
 Carlile v. Morgan, 922 P.2d 1,6 (Utah 1996). 
101
 While most cases interpreting this clause deal with access to courts or legislatures, 
it has been recognized as being relevant to appealing from a zoning decision. See Matter 
ofLarsen, 616 A.2d 529, 593 (Pa. 1992), cert, denied 510 U.S. 815 (1993) and cases cited 
therein. 
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Furthermore, Citizens rely on the protection that a "person shall be not deprived of. . . 
liberty or property without due process of law."102 As noted earlier, the provisions of Utah's 
due process clause have been interpreted and applied many times without implementing 
legislation. To that degree, the inherent rights protected by this clause can also be applied 
in this case. Finally, Citizens rely on the protection afforded by the constitutional 
requirement that "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation."103 As this 
language has already been applied by the Utah Supreme Court without implementing 
legislation, there is no reason why it should not be applied in this case. Computation of 
damages may be appropriately determined on remand to the trial court.104 
CONCLUSION 
Undisputed facts show that the City violated mandatory requirements in city 
ordinances and state statutes when granting approval to a planned unit development that 
negatively impacts on the Citizens' property interests as adjoining property owners. The 
102
 Utah Const, Art. I, § 7. 
103Utah Const., Art. I, § 24.("All laws of general nature shall have uniform operation.") 
Cases interpreting this provision without any legislation include: "This section acts as 
Utah's equal protection clause." Amax Magnesium Corporation v. Tax Commission, 796 
P.2d 1256, 1261 n. 22 (Utah 1990). These provisions are "at least as vigorous as that 
required by the federal constitution, and probably more so." Blue Cross and Blue Shield 
v. State, 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989); see also Mountain Fuel Supply v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, 752 P.2d 884, 890 (Utah 1988). 
104
 Of course, having demonstrated deprivation of a municipal or state created liberty 
interest and property right, and damages arising therefrom, if this Court found no damages 
are recoverable under state constitutional provisions, Citizens are entitled to seek recovery 
as well under the relevant provisions of federal statutory and constitutional law already 
noted previously. 
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Citizens are entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief against the City that such conduct 
was illegal because it violated established law and was arbitrary and capricious, both 
because the City's conduct was illegal and either no mandatory evidence was ever 
reviewed by the City, or if reviewed, no lawful findings were made regarding the same. 
Having shown violation of significant property and liberty interests, Citizens are 
entitled to a remand to the trial court for further proceedings regarding the award of 
damages, attorney fees and costs against the City under self-executing provisions of the 
Utah Constitution and related rights protected by the Fourteenth and First Amendment of 
the United States Constitution. 
DATED this 1st day of June, 1998. 
MATTHEW HILTON, P.C. 
Matthew Hilton 
Attorneys for Citizens 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on June 1, 1998 I hand delivered two copies of the foregoing 
brief with the accompanying addendum to counsel for the City, Jody Burnett, WILLIAMS 
& HUNT, 257 East 200 South # 500, P.O. Box 45678, Salt Lake City, Utah 84145. 
Matthew Hilton 
Attorney for Citizens-Appellants 
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UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SPRINGVILLE CITIZENS FOR A 
BETTER COMMUNITY, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
THE CITY OF SPRINGVILLE, et 
al., 
Defendants. 
CASE NUMBER: 960400547 
DATED: SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 
RULING 
ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
This case is before the court on plaintiffs' motion for partial summary 
judgment, defendants' motion for summary judgment and defendants' motion for 
joinder or to dismiss for failure to join indispensable party. Counsel argued these 
motions on June 17, 1997. I now issue this ruling granting defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. Given that ruling, I do not reach the motion for joinder or to 
dismiss. 
I have read and reread every word of plaintiffs' memorandum supporting their 
motion for partial summary judgment, defendants' memoranda and plaintiffs reply 
memorandum. I have read each of the affidavits and all of the exhibits submitted with 
the affidavits. Finally, I have nearly worn out defendants' exhibit 36, the copy of the 
Springville City building and development code, from flipping the pages back and 
forth as I attempted to learn the applicability of its various provisions. In addition to 
1 
this extensive review of the submissions filed in support and opposition to the 
motions, I have studied the legal authorities cited by the parties. 
In making my decision I am guided by three legal principles: 
a) A presumption exists that the city's action is proper;1 
b) I give deference to the city's interpretation of its own ordinances;2 and 
c) The city's actions approving the PUD must be upheld if those actions 
are in substantial compliance with the city's ordinances.3 
The heart of plaintiffs' gripes is that in approving the PUD at issue in this case, 
the city failed to dot every "i" and cross every "t" with exactness. I cannot quarrel 
with that conclusion. As will be pointed out hereafter, the record is clear that the city 
did not strictly comply with every detail of its PUD approval process. At the same 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-1001(3)(a). MThe Courts shall presume that land use decisions 
and regulations are valid." This statutory presumption, adopted in this form in 1992, is 
consistent with a long line of Utah court decisions. See, Thurston v. Cache County. 626 P.2d 
440, 445 (Utah 1981): "[T]he zoning authority is afforded a broad latitude of discretion, and 
its decision are afforded a strong presumption of validity." Walker v. Brieham Citv. 856 P.2d 
347, 349 (Utah 1993): "In reviewing a municipality's exercise of legislative discretion, this 
court defers to a city council's judgment unless it has acted outside of its authority or its 
actions are such that they are arbitrary and capricious." Cottonwood Heights Citizens 
Association v. Board of Commissioners. 593 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah 1979). 
2
 The dissent m Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp. applied to a municipality interpreting a 
municipal zoning ordinance the time-honored principle of deferring to an administrative 
agency's interpretation of its own regulations. 836 P.2d 797, 807 (Utah App. 1992). The 
reasoning there is meritorious and I apply the same principle: Like an administrative agency, 
a municipality's interpretation of its own ordinance is given great deference by the judiciary. 
Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 836 P.2d 797, 807 (Utah App. 1992); King v. 
Industrial Commit of Utah. 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah App. 1993). 
3
 Sweetwater Properties v. Town of Alta. 622 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1981): "The courts 
are almost unanimious in holding that substantial compliance with annexation law is all that is 
required of municipalities." 
2 
time, however, many of plaintiffs' expressed concerns simply have no merit and arise 
either from a misunderstanding of the development code or from their failure to give 
to the city the deference which is due under the three legal principles set forth above. 
As a result, plaintiffs spent considerable effort wandering in fields of irrelevancy. 
On the other hand, the city asked for much of the problem occasioned by this 
lawsuit because it did not follow with exactness the requirements of its own ordinance 
and plaintiffs rightly point to prior supreme court criticism of this very city for not 
following its own ordinances.4 On balance, however, I am persuaded that the city's 
actions in this case must be upheld 
NATURE OF THE PROJECT 
The project at issue in this case is a planned unit development consisting of 17 
lots located along the foothills south and east of the heart of the city. In 1985, when 
this parcel was annexed to the city, the city zoned most of it RA-1-20,000, which is a 
residential agricultural zone permitting homes on lots having a minimum of 20,000 
square feet; while the rest was zoned H-l, a zone created to protect mountainous and 
other environmentally fragile areas. The only permitted use in the H-l zone is single 
family homes located in a PUD.5 Some ten years after the parcel was annexed, its 
owners, T. Roger Peay and his wife (the "Peays"), decided to develop the property and 
4
 Harris v. Springville Citv, 712 P.2d 188, 189 (Utah 1986): "The material evidence 
adduced in this case indicated that the city authorities disregarded the zoning ordinances and 
acted in derogation thereof. In light of that evidence, the trial judge did not abuse his 
discretion in granting the injunction." 
5
 The H-l zone also allows residential facilities for elderly or handicapped persons as 
conditional, but not permitted uses. 
3 
concluded they must seek approval for a PUD. While I can speculate as to their 
reasons for choosing to develop a PUD rather than a subdivision, their motivations in 
that regard have not been expressed in any of the papers filed with respect to these 
motions.6 In an arduous process which consumed well over a year, the Peays made 
numerous presentations to the planning commission and city counsel and met 
repeatedly with the city attorney, Harold Mitchell. However, Peay's endurance alone 
does not justify sustaining the city's approval of this PUD. Having reviewed the 
tortuous course followed by the Peay's and the city in this circumstance, it is clear that 
the city engaged in a lengthy and detailed review of Peays' proposal, requiring many 
amendments and changes; many of the plaintiffs participated extensively in the city 
meetings where the proposal was on the agenda, criticizing the proposal and urging 
caution and restraint; and the city was diligent in meeting the heart, though admittedly 
not every jot and tittle, of its development code.7 
6
 Three reasons for choosing a PUD rather than a subdivision seem apparent: that portion 
of the property located in the H-l zone can only be developed in the context of a PUD, 
ostensibly because the PUD form requires a greater sensitivity to the particular needs of the 
parcel being developed; greater density is permitted in a PUD than in a subdivision; and the 
developer can be more aggressive in fixing architectural conditions in a PUD than in a 
subdivision. While these issues are apparent, I have no way of knowing why the Peays 
actually decided to develop a PUD rather than a subdivision. Nor is it really important. 
7
 Factually this case is complicated by the pact that Peays first made application for a 
PUD to be located in this area in 1995. The first proposal was known as the Powerhouse 
Mountain Estates PUD. In March 1996 the planning commission gave preliminary approval 
for the Powerhouse Mountain Estates PUD. Subsequently the matter was heard on April 16, 
1996 in a city council public hearing. Thereafter the city council disapproved the proposal. 
The effect of a disapproval is that the developer must start over at the planning commission if 
it wishes to proceed. Peays filed a second application for the Powerhouse Mountain Estates 
PUD consisting of 35 lots. That was the beginning of the process which ultimately resulted 
in the approval now being questioned. Before final approval, as noted in the discussion on 
4 
THE PUD APPROVAL PROCESS 
Development of PUD's is governed by §§ 11-4-301, et seq. of the city 
development code.8 Section 11-4-304 provides that the approval procedure for PUD's 
is that process established by Section 11-4-202 for the approval of large scale 
developments. Thus, in this case I turn to Section 11-4-202 to see whether the city 
properly approved this PUD.9 The approval process set forth in Section 11-4-202 
requires a number of steps. I will set forth each element of the process and explain 
why I conclude that the developer met and the city substantially complied with each 
requirement. 
a) The developer meets with the planning administrator to discuss the basic 
concept of the proposed development and obtain suggestions and input from the 
administrator. 
Plaintiffs make no claim that this step was not followed. 
b) The developer prepares an application, preliminary plans, documents, an 
environmental impact statement and if required, a geologic study, and provides 
evidence of payment of the review fee and its ability to provide conveyance of any 
required water rights. 
The developer had an environmental impact statement prepared with 
respect to the Powerhouse Mountain Estates proposal. That 
environmental impact statement was deemed inadequate and a second 
page 14, Peays decided they would seek final approval of only 17 lots. When they sought 
final approval of the 17 lots they did so under the name Stonebury Estates PUD. 
8
 Because the forms of citation for the Springville City Code and Utah Code Annotated 
are essentially identical, until page 16, all references are to the Springville City Code. 
Thereafter the references are to Utah Code Annotated. 
9
 Much of plaintiffs' argument is that the city failed to comply with provisions of 
Chapter 5 of the development code which governs the creation of subdivisions. In this they 
are in error as the approval process for PUD's is controlled by Section 11-4-202, not that 
chapter. 
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environmental impact statement also was prepared. As well, the 
geologic study also states that it was prepared for the Powerhouse 
Mountain Estates proposal. The city appears to have accepted each of 
these as adequate.10 
c) The planning administrator reviews these documents and submits copies 
to city department heads for their review. 
While the documents unquestionably were submitted to the department 
heads, for the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs are critical of this part 
of the process because they allege some of these documents were not 
timely prepared and thus the department heads did not have all of the 
required information necessary to make recommendations concerning 
the proposal.11 
d) After the preliminary review, the documents are submitted to the 
planning commission for its review. 
Plaintiffs do not contest that the documents were submitted to the 
planning commission, although they do assert that they were not timely 
submitted.12 
e) The planning commission reviews the proposal and acts to approve, 
disapprove or approve subject to modification. 
The planning commission gave its preliminary approval on May 28, 
1996. 
f) The city council holds a public hearing allowing citizen input 
concerning the proposed development. 
The public hearing was held on July 16, 1996. Many of plaintiffs 
appeared and spoke in opposition to the proposed development. 
g) The city council acts upon the preliminary plans to approve, disapprove, 
or approve subject to modification. 
See discussion at page 10. 
11
 For the reasons set forth in the discussion in Section 2 on page 9,1 am not persuaded 
by this argument. 
12
 See discussion on page 12. 
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In this case, the regular session of the city council followed the public 
hearing. At that regular session held on July 16, 1996, the city council 
approved the preliminary plans with 29 stipulations or conditions. The 
minutes of that meeting reflect that the motion which the council 
approved was a motion to approve the Powerhouse Mountain Estates 
PUD. I therefore conclude that this was not an approval subject to 
modification, but an approval with conditions, a procedure allowed by 
Section ll-4-202(8).13 
h) If approved, the developer has a commitment from the city to grant final 
approval if all of the procedures, standards, requirements and any conditions attached 
to the approval are met. The developer then has one year within which to obtain final 
approval. 
On August 28, 1996, well within the one year period, the developer 
filed a plat seeking final approval of 17 of the 35 lots.14 
i) Following preliminary approval by the city council, the developer 
prepares final documents and presents them to the planning commission. 
Proposed final documents were prepared by the developer for 
presentation to the planning commission at its meeting of September 10, 
1996. 
j) "Upon approval of the final plans . . . by the planning commission," 
This requires that the planning commission give final approval to the 
project. In strict terms, the planning commission did not do so. Rather, 
it passed the matter on to the city council without any recommendation 
to either approve or disapprove the development.15 
k) The developer must post its performance guarantee and pay any 
required fees. 
The developer submitted its performance guarantee on November 22, 
13
 Minutes of city council meeting of July 16, 1996, p. 10; Exhibit 23 to the Affidavit of 
Matthew Hilton. 
14
 As noted in the discussion on page 14, Peays decided to seek approval of only 17 of 
the original 35 lots. In making this change they also changed the name of the PUD from 
Powerhouse Mountain Estates to Stonebury Estates. 
15
 See discussion on page 11. 
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1996, and paid the required fees on November 25, 1996.16 
1) Thereafter the matter is referred to the city council for final approval. 
Final approval is evidenced by the adoption and publication of an ordinance amending 
the city zoning map. 
At its regular meeting of November 5, 1996 the city council gave 
tentative final approval of the PUD, noting that not all of the required 
documents had been provided. Thereafter on November 11, 1996 
ordinance 19-96 was signed by the mayor and city recorder. At its 
regular meeting of November 19, 1996 the council adopted the 
ordinance, noting that it would not be recorded until all required bonds 
and documents were in place.17 
The foregoing analysis establishes that with only a few exceptions, the city and 
the developer complied with every step of the approval process for this PUD. I now 
will address the areas where there is a discrepancy and other areas where plaintiffs 
allege there was error or failure to comply with applicable ordinances. 
PLAINTIFFS1 CONCERNS ABOUT THE APPROVAL PROCESS 
1. There was no land held in common in the PUD. 
The development code defines a planned unit development as: "A tract of land 
which is planned and developed as a single entity and wherein part of the land 
facilities is held in common.M Section 11-10-202(14). In fact, however, as finally 
approved by the city council, the PUD in this case did contain land held in common.18 
That it only came late in the game seems unimportant. There was land held in 
16
 See discussion on page 12. 
17
 Minutes of city council meetings of November 5, 1996 and November 19, 1996; 
Exhibits 55 and 58 to Affidavit of Matthew Hilton. 
18
 An unbuildable area of the plat, preserved as a spring protection area, originally had 
been contemplated to be a park. In the final plat the area instead was set aside as common 
area. 
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common. Further, I question whether the city can or should deny a PUD if the sole 
objection is that no land was held in common. Notwithstanding this definitional 
language, it seems to me that in the exercise of its discretion the city could approve a 
PUD without there being land owned in common if the other requirements for a PUD 
are met. 
Closely related to this issue is the fact that the PUD did not contain a common 
storage area as required by Section 11-4-305(1 )(1). That section provides that a 
common storage area must be constructed in each planned unit development. While 
the use of the word "shall" renders this requirement mandatory, where, as here, there 
are large, nearly half-acre lots which allow for individual residences, I find the city 
acted within its discretion to approve the PUD without a common storage area as, 
unlike many densely developed PUD's, the individual lots are large enough for 
individual storage of boats, RV's and other items customarily stored in a common 
storage area. When the approved PUD is examined against the mandatory 
requirements of Section 11-4-305, it is clear that the city required that the developer 
substantially comply with the mandatory standards for a PUD. Though the city did 
not require strict compliance with this requirement, I do not find this failing sufficient 
to justify the relief which plaintiffs seek. 
2. Required documents wens not timely filed* 
The ordinance requires that all documents required for review before an 
application is considered by the planning commission be submitted to the planning 
administrator not less than fifteen days prior to the planning commission meeting at 
9 
which the matter will be considered. At both the preliminary approval stage and the 
final approval stage not all of the required documents were submitted fifteen or more 
days before the planning commission meeting. Plaintiffs complain for two reasons: 
first, the planning commission did not have the opportunity fully to review the 
required documents before the meeting, and second, neither did plaintiffs. Again, 
there is little question that this requirement is mandatory. Yet, there is no evidence 
that the planning commission felt hamstrung by not having all required documents 
before the hearing nor is there evidence that plaintiffs objected at that time either. 
The purpose of this early submission requirement is to allow the planning 
commission and any interested citizens adequate opportunity to review development 
proposals. If the case file in this case demonstrates anything, it is that this proposed 
development was thoroughly reviewed and studied. In giving its preliminary approval 
and sending the PUD to the council for final action, the planning commission was 
satisfied that it had adequate information to make the required decision. The doctrine 
of substantial compliance solves this complaint. 
3. The environmental impact statement and geologic study were 
insufficient 
Plaintiffs criticize both the environmental impact statement and the geologic 
study. Part of their concern is that the environmental impact study was not prepared 
at the time Peays' first proposed development of this property. In fact, however, both 
documents were prepared before the planning commission acted on preliminary 
approval on May 28, 1996. 
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I have reviewed each. On their face each appears to address the issues required 
by the development code. I decline to substitute my judgment for that of the city 
council as to the adequacy of these submissions. 
4. The planning commission did not give its approval to the final plat 
Section 11-4-202 provides that "after the planning commission has approved 
the final plans," the matter is then submitted to the city council for its approval. 
Without question the planning commission did not approve the final plans. Rather it 
submitted the plans with "neither a positive nor a negative vote."19 I take this action 
to be neither an approval nor a disapproval. It was, however, a decision to move the 
matter along to the city council. 
At the planning commission meeting several of the members were troubled by 
the fact the city council had imposed 29 stipulations or conditions on the developer. 
The commissioners apparently did not agree with some of those conditions. Yet, the 
commissioners felt the matter should be passed on to the council. As such the 
commission authorized submission of the project to the council. Another word for 
"authorizing" the submission is "approving". This is not just semantics. The planning 
commission agreed with the notion that the project should proceed to the council. 
That constitutes substantial compliance with the requirement that the planning 
commission approve the project. 
In order to be recorded the plat for the PUD required signatures of the planning 
19
 Minutes of planning commission meeting of September 10, 1996, p. 3; Exhibit 36 to 
Affidavit of Matthew Hilton. 
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administrator and the planning commission chairman. Closely related to the claim the 
commission did not approve the final plan is plaintiffs claim that the signatures on the 
plat were improper. First, the minutes of the meeting demonstrate that the planning 
administrator did not attend the meeting when the planning commission took its action 
and thus he should not have signed the final plat. Yet by signing the plat the planning 
administrator was not certifying he attended the meeting. Rather he was affirming that 
the plat was approved by the planning commission. He can make that affirmation 
without actually having attended the meeting. 
Plaintiffs also assert that the signature of the planning commission chairman 
was forged. Plaintiffs1 counsel asserts in his affidavit: 
That I have read in a copyrighted story in the Deseret News, 
March 7, 1997, and an AP story in the Salt Lake Tribune, March 8, 
1997, that Commission Chairman Steve Curtis indicated that the 
signature on Plat # 4 was not his and that he could not remember 
signing it. 
This is hearsay which has no further support in the record. I do not rely on 
this hearsay statement but on the plat, exhibit 63 to the Affidavit of Matthew Hilton, 
which on its face appears to bear the signature of the planning commission chairman 
and which was approved by the city council. 
5. Certain documents to be submitted and required 
The development code requires that before final approval, certain documents 
and fees be paid and filed, including posting of performance guarantees and payment 
of review and recording fees. Additionally, plaintiffs allege that before final approval 
all required documents should be prepared, executed and, where appropriate, delivered 
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to the city. These include articles of incorporation for the home owner's association; 
corporation by-laws; covenants, conditions and restrictions; management agreement; 
open space easement; sale brochure; documents tendering water rights to city and final 
subdivision plat. The record is clear that many of these were not finally prepared and 
submitted until after the final approval by the council. For example, the water rights 
were not tendered until November 20, 1996; the performance guarantee was not 
tendered until November 22, 1996; the impact fees were not paid until November 25, 
1996; the CC&R's were not recorded until December 9, 1996; the articles of 
incorporation were prepared and executed on October 22, 1996, but as of April 4, 
1997 had not been recorded. 
With the exception of the articles of incorporation, all of the foregoing were 
essentially de minimis errors as the city was able to control the final recording of the 
plat, which constituted the final necessary action before a building permit could be 
issued. And the council delayed recording until all of these elements were satisfied 
except the filing of the articles of incorporation. Clearly, as to each of these issues 
but the filing of the articles of incorporation, the doctrine of substantial compliance 
avails as the city had required full compliance before it allowed any actual 
construction. As to the articles, though I have to swallow somewhat harder than for 
the other requirements, because the articles have been executed and all that is required 
is the ministerial act of filing them with the State, I also am convinced that the city 
and the developer have substantially complied with the ordinance. 
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6. The ordinance approving the PUD contains blatant falsehoods* 
On November 11, 1996, the city adopted ordinance 19-96 by which it approved 
the PUD. In the ordinance it is asserted that the approval is subject to all plans, plats, 
documents, conditions of approval and agreements which have been approved and 
adopted by the planning commission and the council and that the planning commission 
recommended the PUD. Plaintiffs assert neither of these statements is accurate. Each 
of these issues is treated elsewhere in this ruling. Standing alone, the statements in 
the ordinance do not render it void. I deny any relief on account of this claim. 
7. The developer was granted preliminary approved for a 35 lot 
development but he sought final approval of a smaller, 17 lot, development 
When the developer was before the planning commission and city council 
seeking preliminary approval he was proposing a 35 lot development. Before he 
appeared before either body seeking final approval, however, he had deleted a portion 
of the property and sought approval of a development of only 17 lots. 
Plaintiffs argue that staged development is inappropriate. However, this is not 
a case of staged development. Rather, the council gave final approval to a PUD 
consisting of 17 lots. Largely for financial reasons the developer concluded he should 
proceed with only part of his original proposal. As a result he cut the project in half. 
But the part as to which he is proceeding was approved in almost exactly the same 
form as a part of the larger project given preliminary approval. So long as the smaller 
development meets all of the requirements of the development code, the city's action 
in approving the smaller development is not inappropriate. As I note in this ruling, I 
14 
find no error in the council's approval of the PUD which would require judicial 
intervention. Reducing the size of the project is not such error. 
8. The grading permit was improperly issued. 
Plaintiffs assert that the grading permit was improperly issued. It is clear that 
several members of the city council agreed that the grading permit was improvidently 
issued,20 although the record is not clear that in fact it was improperly issued. 
For two reasons I deny relief on account of this claim: it has not been factually 
supported and the issuance of a grading permit does not go to the issue before the 
court, which is the adequacy of the approval of the PUD. 
Plaintiffs assert that the grading permit was improperly granted because it 
failed to require a slope no steeper than one vertical foot for every two horizontal 
feet.21 They base this assertion on the affidavits of Nancy Weiser and Debbie 
Bartholomew. Each of these ladies opines that the slope exceeds that allowed by 
ordinance. While these opinions appear uncontroverted, I am not obligated to accept 
them as each opinion lacks foundation. There is no evidence from which I can 
conclude that either of the affiants has sufficient training or experience to offer an 
opinion as to slope of a grade cut. I decline to accept these opinions offered without 
any foundation whatsoever. 
Plaintiffs further assert that the grading permit should not have been issued 
20
 Minutes of city council meeting of August 6, 1996, pp. 9-10; Exhibit 33 to Affidavit 
of Matthew Hilton. 
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 Section 10-6-201. 
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because a grading plan prepared by a civil engineer was required. I have no factual 
basis upon which I can reach the conclusion that an engineered grading plan was 
required. Plaintiffs take the leap, apparently from the dollar cost paid for the grading 
permit, that it was for grading exceeding 5,000 cubic yards, where an engineered 
grading plan is required. This is a leap which I will not take given the factual record 
before the Court. 
Finally, whether the grading permit was properly issued has no relevance to the 
critical issue before the Court: whether the PUD was properly approved. These two 
issues are not legally related, though they in fact both concern the same land. The 
validity of the PUD approval does not rise or fall on the issuance of the grading 
permit. 
DENIAL OF APPEAL TO BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT 
Plaintiffs finally claim that the city denied them the right to appeal to the board 
of adjustment from the approval of the PUD. The city argues that plaintiffs have no 
right to appeal the council's decision to the board of adjustment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-701 requires that each municipality which adopts a 
zoning ordinance must appoint a board of adjustment. Section 10-9-703 provides: 
(1) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide: 
(a) appeals from zoning decisions applying the zoning ordinance . . . . 
Finally, Section 10-9-704 provides that: "The applicant or any other person or entity 
adversely affected by a decision administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance may 
appeal that decision" to the board of adjustment. 
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Several of plaintiffs filed appeals with the city board of adjustments by which 
they sought a review of the city council action approving the PUD. Each of those 
appeals was rejected on the basis that the board of adjustments did not have authority 
to hear the appeal. 
On its face, the state statute requiring the creation of a board of adjustment 
would seem to empower a board of adjustment to hear an appeal in this case because 
the appeals were lodged from "zoning decisions applying the zoning ordinance.M 
The city disagrees, asserting that the board of adjustment is not empowered to 
hear appeals from zoning decisions made by the city council. 
Neither party has cited the case which controls decision of this issue: Bennion 
v. Sundance Development Corp.. 897 P.2d 1232 (Utah App. 1995). In Bennion the 
court of appeals concluded that a county board of adjustments acting pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §17-27-703 has authority to review the actions of a county legislative body, 
the county commission. M[W]e conclude that the Commission is an administrative 
officer for purposes of the ordinance, and that the Board therefore had jurisdiction to 
hear plaintiffs appeal from the Commission's decision.1* Bennion at 1236. This broad 
conclusion is narrowed, however, by the court's explanation in footnote 5. There the 
court observed that the broad ruling stated in Bennion was not without limitation: the 
board of adjustment "had no authority to hear the subject of the suit [in Sandv Citv v. 
Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992)], namely the propriety of rezoning 
legislation. Bennion at 1236, n. 5. 
Though at first blush it would seem under Bennion that the decision of the city 
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council was susceptible of review on appeal by the city board of adjustment, the 
exception of footnote 5 controls. In this case the city council approved an ordinance 
amending the city zoning map. That is legislative action by a legislative body—the 
city council—as to which the board of adjustment has no appellate jurisdiction. I am 
persuaded that plaintiffs did not have a right to appeal to the board of adjustment from 
what they considered an adverse decision by the city council. Not having such an 
appeal, their constitutional argument that they were improperly denied such an appeal 
also fails. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus has been a difficult case. I start from the proposition that the city's action 
is entitled to a presumption of validity and that the doctrine of substantial compliance 
may rescue the city from its failure to follow with exactness its own ordinances. The 
citizens who brought this lawsuit convincingly assert that the city failed to follow the 
letter of the development code when it approved the Stonebury Estates PUD. This 
case is difficult because to rule for the city, I must rescue the city from its own failure 
to follow the rules by throwing it the lifeline of substantial compliance. Having spent 
a serious effort to study all of the actions of the city, I am convinced that this is an 
appropriate case for use of that doctrine. I thus grant the city's motion for summary 
judgment of dismissal of the complaint. 
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Pursuant to Rule 4-504, Utah Code of Judicial Administration, the city's 
counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order. 
Dated thisj? day of September, 1997. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ S £ ' * » ^ , 
S L 
SCHOFIELD, JUDGE 
*?*f*7jr*//> 
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